Requiring covariance of Maxwell's equations without a priori imposing charge invariance allows for both spin-1 and spin-1/2 transformations of the complete Maxwell field and current. The spin-1/2 case yields new transformation rules, with new invariants, for all traditional Maxwell field and source quantities. The accompanying spin-1/2 representations of the Lorentz group employ the Minkowski metric, and consequently the primary spin-1/2 Maxwell invariants are also spin-1 invariants; for example, Φ2−A2, E2−B2+2iE⋅B−2. The associated Maxwell Lagrangian density is also the same for both (...) spin-1 and spin-1/2 fields. However, in the spin-1/2 case, standard field and source quantities are complex and both charge and gauge invariance are lost. Requiring the potentials to satisfy the Klein–Gordon equation equates the Maxwell and field-potential equations with two Dirac equations of the Klein–Gordon mass, and thus one complex Klein–Gordon Maxwell field describes either two real vector fields or two Dirac fields, all of the same mass. (shrink)

Benevolent intersubjectivity developed in parent–infant interactions and compassion toward friend and foe alike are non-violent interventions to group behavior in conflict. Based on a dyadic active inference framework rooted in specific parental brain mechanisms, we suggest that interventions promoting compassion and intersubjectivity can reduce stress, and that compassionate mediation may resolve conflicts.

This article reconsiders the issue of Luce Irigaray's proximity to Jacques Derrida on the question of woman. I use Derrida's reading of Nietzsche in Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles (1979) and Irigaray's reading of Heidegger in L'Oubli de l'air (1983) to argue that reading them as supplements to one another is more accurate and more productive for feminism than separating one from the other. I conclude by laying out the benefits for feminism that such a reading would offer.

Seventeen years before Kant published The Critique of Pure Reason, there appeared another work designed to undercut Hume’s skepticism and the principles upon which that skepticism was based—Thomas Reid’s Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense. In this ambitious work, Reid hoped to show, against Hume, that there need be no quarrel between common sense and philosophical inquiry. “Philosophy,” proclaimed Reid, “has no other roots but the principles of Common Sense; it grows out of them, and (...) draws its nourishment from them.” Reid’s self-imposed task was thus two-fold—to expose the errors in philosophical method which had inexorably culminated in Hume’s phenomenalistic atomism, and correlatively to provide a more adequate metaphysical scheme which could avoid the pitfalls of skepticism while doing justice to our ordinary beliefs about the world. (shrink)

Since the election of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte in 2016, extra-judicial killings have become commonplace as a result of his administration’s declaration of war on drugs. Empirical cross-national work on examining determinants behind state repression remains scant especially in understanding the phenomenon at the sub-national level. This study investigates what accounts for variations on EJKs at the level of Philippine provinces. Using monthly panel-data for 62 provinces and employing various count-model regressions, the findings indicate that Philippine provinces which have large (...) populations, stronger state capacity, and are more affluent in terms of the human development index are more likely to exhibit higher rates of EJKs. Furthermore, the vote share of the President in the 2016 elections and presidential visits to specific provinces are correlated with higher incidences of EJKs—corroborating theories on delegative democracies and penal populism. Lastly, it is found that drug-prone provinces are more likely to experience a higher share of human rights violations in terms of EJKs, compared to provinces that have lower affectation rates. The implications suggest that the Philippine war on drugs seem to promote vertical accountability as international criticism and domestic opposition mounts. (shrink)

The Law of Non-Contradiction - that no contradiction can be true - has been a seemingly unassailable dogma since the work of Aristotle, in Book G of the Metaphysics. It is an assumption challenged from a variety of angles in this collection of original papers. Twenty-three of the world's leading experts investigate the 'law', considering arguments for and against it and discussing methodological issues that arise whenever we question the legitimacy of logical principles. The result is a balanced inquiry into (...) a venerable principle of logic, one that raises questions at the very centre of logic itself. The aim of this volume is to present a comprehensive debate about the Law of Non-Contradiction, from discussions as to how the law is to be understood, to reasons for accepting or re-thinking the law, and to issues that raise challenges to the law, such as the Liar Paradox, and a 'dialetheic' resolution of that paradox. The editors contribute an introduction which surveys the issues and serves to frame the debate, and a useful bibliography offering a guide to further reading. This volume will be of interest to anyone working on philosophical logic, and to anyone who has ever wondered about the status of logical laws and about how one might proceed to mount arguments for or against them. (shrink)

Purpose The developing academic field of machine ethics seeks to make artificial agents safer as they become more pervasive throughout society. In contrast to computer ethics, machine ethics is concerned with the behavior of machines toward human users and other machines. This study aims to use an action-based ethical theory founded on the combinational aspects of deontological and teleological theories of ethics in the construction of an artificial moral agent. Design/methodology/approach The decision results derived by the AMA are acquired via (...) fuzzy logic interpretation of the relative values of the steady-state simulations of the corresponding rule-based fuzzy cognitive map. Findings Through the use of RBFCMs, the following paper illustrates the possibility of incorporating ethical components into machines, where latent semantic analysis and RBFCMs can be used to model dynamic and complex situations, and to provide abilities in acquiring causal knowledge. Research limitations/implications This approach is especially appropriate for data-poor and uncertain situations common in ethics. Nonetheless, to ensure that a machine with an ethical component can function autonomously in the world, research in artificial intelligence will need to further investigate the representation and determination of ethical principles, the incorporation of these ethical principles into a system’s decision procedure, ethical decision-making with incomplete and uncertain knowledge, the explanation for decisions made using ethical principles and the evaluation of systems that act based upon ethical principles. Practical implications To date, the conducted research has contributed to a theoretical foundation for machine ethics through exploration of the rationale and the feasibility of adding an ethical dimension to machines. Further, the constructed AMA illustrates the possibility of utilizing an action-based ethical theory that provides guidance in ethical decision-making according to the precepts of its respective duties. The use of LSA illustrates their powerful capabilities in understanding text and their potential application as information retrieval systems in AMAs. The use of cognitive maps provides an approach and a decision procedure for resolving conflicts between different duties. Originality/value This paper suggests that cognitive maps could be used in AMAs as tools for meta-analysis, where comparisons regarding multiple ethical principles and duties can be examined and considered. With cognitive mapping, complex and abstract variables that cannot easily be measured but are important to decision-making can be modeled. This approach is especially appropriate for data-poor and uncertain situations common in ethics. (shrink)

We argue that if Stephen Yablo (2005) is right that philosophers of mathematics ought to endorse a fictionalist view of number-talk, then there is a compelling reason for deflationists about truth to endorse a fictionalist view of truth-talk. More specifically, our claim will be that, for deflationists about truth, Yablo’s argument for mathematical fictionalism can be employed and mounted as an argument for truth-theoretic fictionalism.

In Vagueness and Contradiction (2001), Roy Sorensen defends and extends his epistemic account of vagueness. In the process, he appeals to connections between vagueness and semantic paradox. These appeals come mainly in Chapter 11, where Sorensen offers a solution to what he calls the no-no paradox—a “neglected cousin” of the more famous liar—and attempts to use this solution as a precedent for an epistemic account of the sorites paradox. This strategy is problematic for Sorensen’s project, however, since, as we establish, (...) he fails to resolve the semantic pathology of the no-no paradox. (shrink)

Analytic Philosophy, Volume 62, Issue 4, Page 427-438, December 2021.

Stephen Read has presented an argument for the inconsistency of the concept of validity. We extend Read’s results and show that this inconsistency is but one half of a larger problem. Like the concept of truth, validity is infected with what we call semantic pathology, a condition that actually gives rise to two symptoms: inconsistency and indeterminacy. After sketching the basic ideas behind semantic pathology and explaining how it manifests both symptoms in the concept of truth, we present cases that (...) establish the indeterminacy of validity and that link this indeterminacy with the concept’s inconsistency. Our conclusion is that an adequate treatment of the semantic pathology thus revealed must deal with both of its symptoms. Further, it must extend to the occurrences of this condition elsewhere: in the concept of truth, in the other central semantic notions, and even in certain philosophical concepts outside semantics. (shrink)

In this paper, we do two things. First, we clarify the notion of deflationism, with special attention to deflationary accounts of truth. Second, we argue that one who endorses a deflationary account of truth (or of semantic notions, generally) should be, or perhaps already is, a pretense theorist regarding truth-talk. In §1 we discuss mathematical fictionalism, where we focus on Yablo’s pretense account of mathematical discourse. §2 briefly introduces the key elements of deflationism and explains deflationism about truth in particular. (...) §3 discusses why deflationary accounts of truth should be construed as pretense accounts and gives a preliminary sketch of a particular pretense account of truth-talk. §4 addresses a main objection to a pretense account, and §5 concludes. (shrink)

This article reconsiders the issue of Luce Irigaray's proximity to Jacques Derrida on the question of woman. I use Derrida's reading of Nietzsche in Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles and Irigaray's reading of Heidegger in L'Oubli de l'air to argue that reading them as supplements to one another is more accurate and more productive for feminism than separating one from the other. I conclude by laying out the benefits for feminism that such a reading would offer.

There are things we routinely say that may strike us as literally false but that we are nonetheless reluctant to give up. This might be something mundane, like the way we talk about the sun setting in the west, or it could be something much deeper, like engaging in talk that is ostensibly about numbers despite believing that numbers do not literally exist. Rather than regard such behaviour as self-defeating, a "fictionalist" is someone who thinks that this kind of discourse (...) is entirely appropriate, even helpful, so long as we treat what is said as a useful fiction, rather than as the sober truth. "Fictionalism" can be broadly understood as a view that uses a notion of pretense or fiction in order to resolve certain puzzles or problems that otherwise do not necessarily have anything to do with literature or fictional creations. Within contemporary analytic philosophy, fictionalism has been on the scene for well over a decade and has matured during that time, growing in popularity. There are now myriad competing views about fictionalism and consequently the discussion has branched out into many more subdisciplines of philosophy. Yet there is widespread disagreement on what philosophical fictionalism actually amounts to and about how precisely it ought to be pursued. This volume aims to guide these discussions, collecting some of the most up-to-date work on fictionalism and tracing the view's development over the past decade. After a detailed discussion in the book's introductory chapter of how philosophers should think of fictionalism and its connection to metaontology more generally, the remaining chapters provide readers with arguments for and against this view from leading scholars in the fields of epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, and others. (shrink)

Over the past 25 years, Graham Priest has ably presented and defended dialetheism, the view that certain sentences are properly characterized as true with true negations. Our goal here is neither to quibble with the tenability of true, assertable contradictions nor, really, with the arguments for dialetheism. Rather, we wish to address the dialetheist's treatment of cases of semantic pathology and to pose a worry for dialetheism that has not been adequately considered. The problem that we present seems to have (...) broader bite, afflicting both consistent and inconsistent proposals for resolving semantic pathology. Thus, while our primary goal is to uncover some important connections between dialetheism, semantic pathology, and other, more general issues, the problem that we pose might be a worry for anyone who aims to resolve semantic pathology - consistently or not. (shrink)

Using ideas proposed in Aboutness and developed in ‘If-thenism’, Stephen Yablo has tried to improve on classical if-thenism in mathematics, a view initially put forward by Bertrand Russell in his Principles of Mathematics. Yablo’s stated goal is to provide a reading of a sentence like ‘The number of planets is eight’ with a sort of content on which it fails to imply ‘Numbers exist’. After presenting Yablo’s framework, our paper raises a problem with his view that has gone virtually unnoticed (...) in the literature. If we are right, then Yablo’s version of if-thenism cannot succeed. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider the question of whether or not the deflationist about truth can respond to the Liar and allied paradoxes by taking sentences such as the following: (1) (1) is false (2) (2) is not true (3) (3) is true to be meaningless. Let's call this strategy for dealing with the Liar and Liar-like phenomena the Meaningless Strategy. This strategy is intuitively satisfying: it captures many people's initial response to the paradoxes; and it is theoretically important: if (...) successful, it might allow the deflationist to avoid the revenge problem that plagues so many putative solutions to the Liar. Moreover, owing to the austerity of their theory, deflationists have very few resources to deploy in attempting to accommodate the Liar, which means that if the deflationist is in a good position to employ the Meaningless Strategy, so much the better for deflationism. (shrink)

Bradley's rich and complex version of Absolute Idealism plays a key role not only in Idealist philosophy, politics, and ethics, but also in the development of modern logic, analytical philosophy, and pragmatism, as well as in the thinking of such figures as R. G. Collingwood and A. N. Whitehead. Topics covered include: the history of Idealism in the twentieth century; Bradley's relation to figures such as Bernard Bosanquet, C. A. Campbell, Brand Blanshard, John Watson, John Dewey, and others; Bradley's influence (...) on twentieth-century empiricism, modern logic, and analytical philosophy; and his significance for contemporary debates in epistemology and ethics. (shrink)

The wager fragment in Blaise Pascal’s _Penseés _opens with the phrase "_infini rien_"—"infinite nothing"—which is meant to describe the human condition. Pascal was responding to what was, even in the seventeenth century, becoming a pressing human problem: we seem to be able to know much about the world but less about ourselves. The traditional European view of human beings as creatures made in the image of God and potentially capable of a mystical union with God was increasingly confounded by the (...) difficulty of finding God in nature. Despite his own scientific work, however, Pascal argued that if one does not know whether or not God exists, one should bet that he does: if one is right the rewards are infinitely good and, if one is wrong, what one has lost is, by comparison, utterly trivial. The argument behind this wager is one of the most celebrated—and disputed—in the history of philosophy. It has been seen in terms of the calculus of probabilities, as a piece of religious apologetic, as an event in the religious and psychological life of Pascal himself, and as an event in the life of the Jansenist movement and its various expressions at Port-Royal. In this book, Leslie Armour explores the underlying logic of ideas brought to the surface by the intersection of two philosophical lines of thought. He shows that Pascal had come to philosophy by way of two particular strands of Platonism, one strongly mystical, associated with the founder of the French Oratorian order, Pierre de Bérulle, and the other the Augustinian Platonism associated with Duvergier de Hauranne and Cornelius Jansen. At the same time Pascal was engaged in an internal struggle with skepticism. While he agreed that it is difficult to find God in physical nature, he disagreed with the claim that we know nothing of nature. The problem is that the human being is both infinite and nothing. Thus, Armour locates Pascal’s wager within the confluence of a vital neo-Platonism and an intellectually powerful skepticism. He concludes that even today, "If we must act and cannot know enough, we must bet.". (shrink)

In defense of the minimalist conception of truth, Paul Horwich(2001) has recently argued that our acceptance of the instances of the schema,`the proposition that p is true if and only if p', suffices to explain our acceptanceof truth generalizations, that is, of general claims formulated using the truth predicate.In this paper, I consider the strategy Horwich develops for explaining our acceptance of truth generalizations. As I show, while perhaps workable on its own, the strategy is in conflictwith his response to (...) the liar paradox. Something must give. I consider and reject variousalternatives and emendations to the strategy. In order to resolve the conflict,I propose an alternative approach to the liar, one that supports Horwich's strategywhile leaving minimalism maximally uncompromised. (shrink)

In ‘Withdrawal and contextualism’, Jonathan Adler (2006) provides an argument which, if successful, undermines what contextualists take to be prime support for their view. Given the popularity of contextualist (and related) positions in epistemology, together with the fact that, thus far, no one has challenged Adler's argument, a critical assessment therefore presses. In this article, after briefly reviewing Adler's argument, I show that it fails. My reason for taking his argument to fail will then provide novel support for contextualism, one (...) that does not rely on raising the pragmatic stakes. (shrink)

Do inconsistent laws, which are in the form of inconsistent legal obligations, provide us with good reasons for accepting the possibility of legal gluts, which are true legal statements whose negations are also true? Given the contingencies of the law, it is unlikely that many will deny the possibility of inconsistent legal obligations, but it remains an ongoing debate whether these lead to any legal gluts. In a recent debate, Graham Priest [Priest, G. 2006. In ‘Contradiction’. In First printed by (...) Martinus Nijhoff in 1987. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Priest, G. 2017. ‘Where Laws Conflict: An Application of the Method of Chunk and Permeate’. In Law and the New Logics, edited by H. Glenn, and L. Smith, 168–180. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press] has argued from inconsistent obligations to legal gluts and JC Beall [Beall, JC 2017. ‘On inconsistent laws and gluts’. In Law and the New Logics, edited by H. Glenn, and L. Smith, 199–207. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.], while he has acknowledged that there are inconsistent obligations, has argued against Priest’s arguments for legal gluts. In this paper, after reviewing the debate, I adjudicate it and provide reasons for resisting Beall’s arguments again Priest thereby providing a possibility for legal gluts. (shrink)

Reid's response to hume has traditionally been taken as begging all of hume's questions. One can, However, Find in reid an argument against hume's phenomenalistic skepticism. Reid's appeal to common sense is an attempt to call attention to the fact that we experience objects as external to us, Not as bundles of impressions. Still, Our access to these objects does arise out of sensations, Which are mental contents. Extending berkeley's idea of the "language of nature" reid suggests that language and (...) signification present apt theoretical models for explaining perception. Using this model, One can provide an answer to the argument from illusion. (shrink)

In this paper, after clarifying certain features of Gideon Rosen’s Modal Fictionalism, I raise two problems for that view and argue that these problems strongly suggest that advocates of a “Deflationist Strategy” ought not to endorse, or adopt Rosen-style Modal Fictionalism.

ABSTRACTIn our paper, we mount a novel argument, which trades on recent work by Roy Sorensen [2016], following work by Saul Kripke, against Yablo's preferred reading of if-thenism, which is an attempt to read problematically ontologically committing sentences in a way that does not carry such ontological commitments. Although our argument is directed at Yablo's proposed reading of if-thenism, if the argument is successful, other versions of if-thenism may be affected. After reviewing Sorensen's recent work and presenting our argument, we (...) consider a possible way out and use this as a means for presenting some challenges to Yablo. (shrink)

We are told modernity's end will destabilize familiar ways of knowing, doing, and being, but are these changes we should dread--or celebrate? Four significant events catalyze this question: the consecration of openly gay Episcopalian Bishop Gene Robinson, the mistreatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison, the politicization of the death of Terri Schiavo, and the disastrous response to Hurricane Katrina. Framed by an original appropriation of Michel Foucault, and drawing on resources in visual culture theory and the history of photography, (...) Ellen T. Armour explores the anxieties, passions, and power dynamics bound up in the photographic representation and public reception of these events. Together, these phenomena expose modernity's benevolent and malevolent disruptions and reveal the systemic fractures and fissures that herald its end, for better and for worse. In response to these signs and wonders, Armour lays the groundwork for a theology and philosophy of life better suited to our modern moment: one that owns up to the vulnerabilities that modernity sought to disavow and better enables us to navigate the ethical issues we now confront. (shrink)

In close collaboration with the late Matthew Lipman, Ann Margaret Sharp pioneered the theory and practice of ‘the community of philosophical inquiry’ (CPI) as a way of practicing ‘Philosophy for Children’ and prepared thousands of philosophers and teachers throughout the world in this practice. In Community of Inquiry with Ann Margaret Sharp represents a long-awaited and much-needed anthology of Sharp’s insightful and influential scholarship, bringing her enduring legacy to new generations of academics, postgraduate students and researchers in the fields of (...) education, philosophy, philosophy of education, Philosophy for Children and philosophy of childhood. Sharp developed a unique perspective on the interdependence of education, philosophy, personhood and community that remains influential in many parts of the world. This perspective was shaped not only by Sharp’s work in philosophy and education, but also by her avid studies in literature, feminism, aesthetic theory and ecumenical spirituality. Containing valuable contributions from senior figures in the fields in which Sharp produced her most focused scholarship, the chapters in this book present a critical overview of how Sharp’s ideas relate to education, philosophy of education, and the Philosophy for Children movement as a whole. The historical and philosophical nature of this collection means that it will be a vital resource for philosophers and educators. It should also be of great interest to teacher educators and those involved in the study of pragmatism and feminism, as well as the history of education across the globe, particularly in the United States of America. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Ceci est une réponse à l’étude critique de Vance Maxwell, «Making God Go Away», consacrée au livre de Leslie Armour, Being and Idea. La discussion porte sur la question suivante: est-il possible qu’il y ait une signification transcendante à nos vies sans un Dieu tyrannique? Le livre traitait, de manière centrale, du fait que les réponses affirmatives à cette question exigent une unification du savoir. Maxwell suggère que le livre est un commentaire de Spinoza et de Hegel — (...) malgré son soustitre: Developments of Some Themes in Spinoza and Hegel. Et il ignore la tentative qui s’y trouve poursuivie de construire un système nouveau. Le présent article explique ce système et défend certaines lectures de Spinoza. (shrink)